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FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

adds to the federal common law surrounding ERISA the idea that a federal
court will not grant recovery under ERISA when an injunction based on a
state statute actually caused the damages that a plaintiff seeks to recover.
Such damages are not recoverable under ERISA because of the extracontractual nature of the damages.
LABOR LAW
West Virginia Code section 18A-4-8b(b) (1982) (section 18A-4-8b(b))
provides the guidelines for a county board of education to follow in the
promotion and hiring of service personnel. The statute requires a board of
education to make hiring and promotion decisions on the basis of seniority,
qualifications, and evaluation of past service. 104 In Cox v. Board of Education of Hampshire County, 355 S.E.2d 365 (W.Va. 1987), the West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals reviewed the statutory requirement that
a board of education fill service personnel positions on a seniority basis.1os
The court in Cox did not reach a final determination of the issue of the
qualification of plaintiffs for a service position, though, because the board
eliminated the job position in question. 106 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, however, interpreted the requirements of
the statute in an action alleging hiring discrimination against a West Virginia
county board of education in Dalton v. Mercer County Board of Education,
887 F.2d 490 (4th Cir. 1989).
In Dalton the Fourth Circuit reviewed the Mercer County Board of
Education's (Board) appeal to Frank M. Dalton, Jr.'s claim that the Board
violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)' °0 because the
Board failed to hire Dalton for a service position because of his age. The
Fourth Circuit considered the Board's main contention that section 18A-48b(b) required the Board to hire the qualified applicant having the most

(stating in dicta, without reference to specific section of ERISA, that extracontractual damages
are not recoverable under ERISA).
104. W. VA. CODE § 18A-4-8b(b) (1982). Section 18A-4-8b(b) provides:

A county board of education shall make decisions affecting promotion and filling
of any service personnel positions of employment or jobs occurring throughout the
school year that are to be performed by service personnel as provided in section
eight [Section 18A-4-8], article four of this chapter, on the basis of seniority,
qualifications and evaluation of past service.
Qualifications shall mean that the applicant holds a classification title in his category
of employment as provided in this section and must be given first opportunity for
promotion and filling vacancies. Other employees then must be considered and shall
qualify by meeting the definition of the job title as defined by section eight, article
four of this chapter, that relates to the promotion or vacancy. ...

Id.
105. Cox v. Bd. of Educ. of Hampshire County, 355 S.E.2d 365, 369 (W.Va. 1987)
(holding seniority rights provided in West Virginia Code section 18A-4-8b extend only to
service personnel positions and not to professional personnel positions).
106. Id.
107. 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1967).
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seniority. Dalton, a sixty-one year old without any seniority as a service
employee with the Board, was one of eleven applicants for the position of
coordinator of transportation. The Board hired William Hopkins, a fortyone year old with seventeen years of seniority, for the position. Dalton
alleged that the Board did not hire him because of his age, and brought
this civil rights action against the Board.
The jury before the United States District Court for the Southern
District of West Virginia decided in favor of Dalton. The Board appealed,
arguing first that the district court erred in failing to enter a judgment not
withstanding the verdict, based on the seniority provision of the section
18A-4-8b(b). The Board also asserted that the district court should have
allowed the Board to ask certain hypothetical questions to its personnel,
and that the evidence was insufficient to prove that the Board was guilty
of willful discrimination against Dalton. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit
considered only whether section 18A-4-8b(b) required the Board to hire the
qualified applicant with the most seniority.
In deciding whether the statute mandated the Board to hire Hopkins,
the candidate possessing seniority with the Board, the Fourth Circuit focused
on the language of section 18A-4-8b(b). The Dalton court noted that this
section required the Board to promote or hire service personnel on the basis
of seniority, qualifications, and evaluation of past service. The Fourth
Circuit also interpreted the section's definition of "qualifications" to relate
to past employment with the Board. Applying these factors to the instant
case, the Fourth Circuit recognized that Hopkins was qualified for the
position because he qualified for the Board's posted educational and employment experience. The Dalton court further found that Hopkins possessed
substantial seniority because of Hopkins' seventeen years of seniority as a
service employee for the Board. The Fourth Circuit held that the West
Virginia statute required the Board to comply with the seniority provision.
The Dalton court concluded that, based on the seniority of the two applicants, the Board acted correctly by hiring Hopkins and not Dalton. The
Dalton court additionally found that the ADEA permitted an employer to
comply with a seniority system. Consequently, the Fourth Circuit found
that the Board did not violate the ADEA by complying with section 18A4-8b(b)'s seniority provision, and reversed the decision of the United States
District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia.
In holding that the Board did not commit age discrimination when it
complied with the West Virginia statute and hired the most qualified senior
applicant for coordinator of transportation, the Fourth Circuit ruled in
accord with the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia. 08

108. Cox v. Board of Educ. of Hampshire County, 355 S.E.2d 365, 369 (holding that
seniority hiring provisions of W.Va. Code apply only to service personnel positions and not
to professional personnel positions).
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The Civil Rights Act of 1964, section 703(a), 42 U.S.C. section 2000e2(a) (1988) (section 2000e-2(a)), prohibits employers from engaging in discriminatory employment practices. An employer's discharge of an employee
because of the employee's sex constitutes an unlawful employment practice
in violation of section 2000e-2(a).' 9 An employer's discharge of a female
employee because of the employee's pregnancy also constitutes a discharge
because of sex in violation of section 2000e-2(a)." 0 An employee who suffers
from a discriminatory employment practice may file an enforcement action
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC),"' or, if the
EEOC's enforcement actions fail to resolve the dispute between the employer
12
and employee, the employee may file a civil action against the employer.
An employee who prevails in an action against an employer may secure
reinstatement with back pay'2 and, in the court's discretion, reasonable
attorney's fees." 4 Against this statutory background, in EEOC v. Service
News Co., 898 F.2d 958 (4th Cir. 1990), the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit reviewed both a district court's judgment that an
employer unlawfully discharged a pregnant employee and the district court's
award of back pay, medical expenses and attorney's fees to the employee.
In Service News the plaintiff, EEOC, sued the defendant, Service News
Company (Service News), alleging that Service News had discharged a
pregnant employee, Phillips, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1981). Service News is a book and
periodical distributor in Wilmington, North Carolina. Heck, the general
manager of Service News, hired Phillips on July 3, 1985, to work as a
scanner operator, a job requiring Phillips to lift boxes weighing over 25
pounds. After testing negative for pregnancy on September 19 and October
3, 1985, Phillips tested positive for pregnancy on October 22, 1985. After
informing Heck of her pregnancy, Phillips met with Heck on October 23,
1985. Although Phillips' doctor approved of her continued employment and
although Phillips desired to continue working, Heck expressed concern about
Phillips' ability to continue working while pregnant. Heck discussed the
possibility of unemployment benefits and continued health insurance coverage with Phillips, and Phillips concluded that Heck had fired her.

109. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988) (prohibiting
sexually discriminatory discharge of employee).
110. See Civil Rights Act § 701(k), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (defining statutory terms "because
of sex" to include employment discrimination because of employee's pregnancy).
1II. See Civil Rights Act § 706(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (giving EEOC power to
investigate and resolve charges of discriminatory employment practices).
112. See Civil Rights Act § 706(g), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (giving employee cause of
action against discriminatory employer).
113. See Civil Rights Act § 706(g), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (providing for award of back
pay to reinstated employee).
114. See Civil Rights Act § 706(k), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (providing for discretionary
award of attorney's fees to prevailing party in enforcement action).
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Although Phillips continued to pay health insurance premiums to Service
News, the insurance company soon informed Phillips that she was ineligible
for coverage, and Service News refunded Phillips' premium payments.
Phillips was unable to secure other coverage because her pregnancy was a
pre-existing condition. After her termination, Phillips searched for employment for five months. When Piece Goods Shop rejected Phillips' application
for employment because of her pregnancy, Phillips concluded that her
search for employment would be fruitless.
After giving birth on June 24, 1986, Phillips worked for different
employers from August until September and from December 1986 until midFebruary 1987. In each instance, Phillips voluntarily quit working because
transportation and child care costs exceeded her possible income. Service
News rehired Phillips on June 10, 1987. During each period of unemployment after the birth of her child, Phillips actively sought work and submitted
numerous employment applications. Phillips filed a charge of discrimination
with the New Hanover Human Relations Commission after her termination
on October 23, 1985. Although Service News eventually reinstated Phillips,
she could not obtain complete relief in resolution of the charge. Consequently, the EEOC sued Service News in the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of North Carolina on March 7, 1988, alleging that
Service News had discharged Phillips because of her pregnancy in violation
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1981).
The district court held that Service News had violated Title VII by discharging Phillips on account of her pregnancy and awarded Phillips back pay in
the amount of $12,059.34, medical expenses associated with Phillips' pregnancy in the amount of $2,791.91, and attorney's fees in the amount of
$1,425.00.
Service News appealed the district court's judgment and award of back
pay, medical expenses, and attorney's fees to Phillips. Before addressing
the propriety of the district court's judgment and award, the Fourth Circuit
considered Service News' argument that the district court erred in certain
findings of fact and failed to make other necessary findings of fact. The
Fourth Circuit disagreed with Service News' argument that Heck did not
discharge Phillips and that Phillips was not pregnant when she enrolled in
Service News' health insurance plan. The Service News court found sufficient
evidence in the record supporting each finding and concluded that the
district court's judgment in each instance was not clearly erroneous. The
Fourth Circuit, however, agreed with Service News concerning the beginning
date for computing the award of back pay. The Fourth Circuit noted that
the district court awarded Phillips back pay from July 24, 1986, one month
after the birth of Phillips' baby, although Phillips did not return to work
until August 11, 1986. The Service News court noted that no evidence in
the record supported the use of the earlier date to compute the award of
back pay. Accordingly, the court held that the back pay award should be
recalculated using August 11 as the earliest possible date that Phillips could
have returned to work.
The Fourth Circuit disagreed with Service News' arguments concerning
the district court's failure to make certain findings of fact. Service News
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argued that the district court should have made a finding on the theory of
"constructive discharge" because neither Heck nor Phillips used the word
"fired" or "discharged" in their conversation on October 23. The Fourth
Circuit disagreed, noting that the use of specific words is unnecessary for
a finding of actual discharge and that neither party proposed the theory of
constructive discharge at trial. The Fourth Circuit also rejected Service
News' argument that the district court should have ruled on the business
necessity defense that would have justified Service News' seemingly discriminatory behavior as a protection of the health of Phillips and her unborn
fetus. Citing its previous decision in Wright v. Olin Corp., 697 F.2d 1172,
1185-86 n.21 (4th Cir. 1982), the Fourth Circuit noted that the business
necessity defense normally applies to disparate impact analysis of discrimination claims and not to overt discrimination claims such as the EEOC's
claim on behalf of Phillips. The Fourth Circuit noted, however, that even
if the business necessity defense applied to Service News' actions, Wright
required that the employer establish, by objective evidence, the risk of harm
to the fetus, the necessity of protective action, and the effectiveness of the
employer's actions in preventing such harm. Because Service News presented
only evidence of Heck's subjective belief that Phillips should not continue
working, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the district court did not err by
failing to address the business necessity defense. Finally, the Fourth Circuit
rejected Service News' argument that the district court erred by failing to
rule on whether Heck offered to rehire Phillips before the actual date of
her re-employment. The Service News court noted that no evidence in the
record supported such a finding because the evidence suggested that Heck
only mentioned rehiring Phillips to an investigator with the New Hanover
Human Relations Commission and not to Phillips personally.
After addressing Service News' preliminary arguments, the Fourth Circuit addressed the propriety of the award for back pay, medical expenses,
and attorney's fees. Service News first argued that the back pay award was
improper because Phillips made insufficient efforts to mitigate damages by
seeking other employment. Service News argued that the district court should
have examined three discrete time periods when computing the back pay
award. The Fourth Circuit declined to adopt a fixed rule requiring a trial
court to examine discrete time periods when determining back pay awards,
but the court concluded that the award to Phillips for the first five months
of unemployment after termination was erroneous. The Service News court
noted that during these five months Phillips' only effort to secure employment consisted of looking through want ads. The Fourth Circuit held that
only looking through want ads for unskilled employment was insufficient
to prove mitigation of damages and, therefore, concluded that Phillips'
back pay award should be reduced for the five month period. The Fourth
Circuit, however, upheld the award of back pay to Phillips for the remainder
of her pregnancy after Phillips' unsuccessful employment application at
Piece Goods Shop. The Fourth Circuit distinguished Hayes v. Shelby
Memorial Hosp., 546 F. Supp. 259, 266 (N.D. Ala. 1982), aff'd, 726 F.2d
1543 (11th Cir. 1984), which held that a discharged pregnant employee who
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believed that efforts to obtain employment would be futile was not entitled
to back pay because the employee had no basis for that belief and made
no effort to secure employment. The Service News court noted that Phillips
had attempted to obtain work and was rejected. Consequently, the court
concluded that Phillips justifiably believed that further efforts to secure
employment while pregnant would be unsuccessful. Finally, the Fourth
Circuit refused to reduce Phillips' back pay award to account for child care
costs. The Fourth Circuit noted that no authority for such a reduction
exists and that Title VII expressly mentions a reduction in back pay only
for amounts that the employee could have earned with reasonable diligence.
Citing Fariss v. Lynchburg Foundry, 769 F.2d 958 (4th Cir. 1985),
which held that the widow of a wrongfully terminated employee could
recover the premiums but not the proceeds of a life insurance policy, Service
News argued that the district court erred by awarding Phillips the proceeds
of her medical insurance instead of the premiums paid. The Fourth Circuit
disagreed. The Service News court noted that the Farissholding rested upon
the employee's failure to mitigate damages by procuring substitute insurance
coverage. In contrast, the Fourth Circuit noted that Phillips tried to procure
substitute coverage but was unsuccessful because of her preexisting pregnancy. Consequently, the Fourth Circuit held that Phillips was entitled to
reimbursement for the benefits which would have been paid less the costs
of premiums.
Finally, Service News argued that the district court improperly awarded
attorney's fees to Phillips as a prevailing party under 42 U.S.C. section
2000e-5(k) because Phillips was not a formally nominated party in the suit
against Service News. The Fourth Circuit reasoned that restricting the
statutory definition of prevailing party to include only formally nominated
parties would frustrate the intent of the statute, tax both the parties' and
judicial resources, and needlessly raise fees. Consequently, the Fourth Circuit
held that Phillips was entitled to an award of reasonable attorney's fees as
a prevailing party even though Phillips did not intervene as a plaintiff in
the suit against Service News. The Service News court noted, however, that
the district court's analysis of the reasonableness of the award of $1,325.00
of the total attorney's fees to one attorney was too brief given the evidence
in the record. The Fourth Circuit, therefore, remanded the case for a
reconsideration of the reasonableness of the fee in light of the twelve factors
set forth in Barber v. Kimbrell's, Inc., 577 F.2d 216 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 934 (1978). The Fourth Circuit also remanded the case for a
recalculation of the back pay award and determination and deduction of
the amount of premiums from the medical benefits award, affirmed the
district court's factual findings, refusal to make certain findings, and
determination of the measure of damages for medical benefits, and reversed
the district court's award of back pay for certain periods of Phillips'
unemployment.
The Service News court's decision that an employee discharged in
violation of Title VII who is unable to secure substitute insurance may
recover from the employer the proceeds instead of the premiums of the
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insurance resolves a question left unanswered by prior law. 1 5 Most courts
have generally interpreted the remedial provisions of Title VII to offer only
equitable relief and not legal damages.'1 6 Although the Service News decision
arguably transgresses the Title VII limitation on legal remedies, the Fourth
17
Circuit was careful to limit the holding to the particular facts of the case.
Future litigation will be necessary to determine if other courts will follow
the exception to the Title VII limitation on legal relief recognized by the
Service News court. The impact of the Fourth Circuit's expansive definition
of prevailing party to include non-nominated parties also is unclear. Federal
Courts of Appeals considering Title VII's provision for the award of
attorney's fees have wrestled only with the question of whether nominated
plaintiffs qualify for award of fees.' The Fourth Circuit's definition of
prevailing party in Title VII suits to include non-nominated parties also will
require clarification through future litigation.
The "futile gesture" doctrine is a theory that arose in the area of
federal fair employment law.119 The futile gesture doctrine provides that, in
attempting to prove discrimination on the part of an employer, a claimant
need not have actually engaged in the futile gesture of applying for a job
if the claimant can show that the claimant would have applied for the job
but for the claimant's accurate knowledge of the discriminatory practices
and that, had the claimant applied for the job, the employer would have
discriminated against the claimant. The United States Supreme Court recognized the futile gesture doctrine in InternationalBrotherhoodof Teamsters
v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977). Since that case, the doctrine has
become an entrenched theory in fair employment law. 20 Additionally, federal

115. See Fariss v. Lynchburg Foundry, 769 F.2d 958, 965-66 (4th Cir. 1985) (holding that
employer in violation of Title VII is liable for premiums but not proceeds of employee's
insurance coverage but refusing to consider proper measure of damages where employee
attempted but was unable to procure substitute coverage).
116. See Dockter v. Rudolf Wolff Futures, Inc., 913 F.2d 456, 461 (7th Cir. 1990) (stating
that remedial provisions of Title VII provide for equitable relief and not legal damages);
Williams v. United States Gen. Serv. Admin., 905 F.2d 308, 311 (9th Cir. 1990) (same); King
v. Board of Regents, 898 F.2d 533, 537 (7th Cir. 1990) (same); Carroll v. General Accident
Ins. Co., 891 F.2d 1174, 1177 (5th Cir. 1990) (same).
117. See EEOC v. Service News Co., 898 F.2d 958, 964 (4th Cir. 1990) (reiterating Fariss
rule that ordinarily employee may recover only premiums and not proceeds of insurance under
Title VII but finding exception on facts of case).
118. See Woolridge v. Marlene Indus. Corp., 898 F.2d 1169, 1173-74 (6th Cir. 1990)
(considering whether plaintiff in Title VII suit qualifies for award of attorney's fees); Spencer
v. General Elec. Co., 894 F.2d 651, 661-63 (4th Cir. 1990) (same).
119. See International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977)
(recognizing futile gesture doctrine in area of fair employment law).
120. See, e.g., United States v. Gregory, 871 F.2d 1239, 1242 (4th Cir. 1989) (noting that
individual, in making discrimination claim, need not actually submit to humiliation of discrimination if individuals generally know of discriminatory policy); Babrocky v. Jewel Food Co.,
773 F.2d 857, 867 (7th Cir. 1985) (noting that employee need not actually apply for position
in order to qualify for Title VII relief if employee is aware of discriminatory policy which
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courts have adopted fair employment concepts into fair housing law.' 2 ' In
Pinchback v. Armistead Homes Corp., 907 F.2d 1447 (4th Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, _
.Ct. -(1991), the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit considered whether to extend the futile gesture doctrine of
federal fair employment law to fair housing law.
Before reaching the futile gesture issue, the Pinchback court considered
the district court's factual finding of racial discrimination. In Pinchback
the plaintiff, Pinchback, contacted a real estate agent, Dailey, concerning
a house Pinchback had seen in a newspaper advertisement. After missing
the first appointment to see the house, Pinchback called the real estate
agent to schedule another appointment. At this time, Dailey asked Pinchback
whether Pinchback was black. Pinchback responded affirmatively, and
Dailey then informed Pinchback that the community in which the house
was located, a cooperative housing arrangement called Armistead Gardens
(Armistead), did not permit blacks. Assuming the accuracy of Dailey's
description of Armistead's policy, Pinchback looked elsewhere for a home
but found nothing of interest.
After reporting the incident to the Department of Housing and Urban
Development, Pinchback sued Armistead, alleging violations of her rights
under 42 U.S.C. sections 1981 and 1982 (1990), Title VIII, 42 U.S.C.
sections 3601-31, and Maryland's fair housing law. The district court dismissed the Title VIII claims because the statute of limitations had run.
On the remaining claims, the United States District Court for the District
of Maryland found that Armistead had discriminated against blacks. Applying the futile gesture doctrine of fair employment law to the fair housing
claims, the district court found that Armistead would have discriminated
against Pinchback if Pinchback had applied for a leasehold and also that
Pinchback would have applied if Pinchback had not had a reasonable belief
that, because of the discriminatory policy, she would be wasting time by
applying.
The district court made the following factual findings: first, that Armistead discriminated against blacks; second, that Pinchback was a bona
fide purchaser with a sincere interest in and the financial capability to buy
the house; third, that Dailey's description of Armistead's discriminatory
policy reasonably deterred Pinchback from applying for a leasehold because
Pinchback's reliance on Dailey as a source of information about the
community was reasonable; and fourth, that Armistead was the direct or
indirect source of the information that Dailey conveyed to Pinchback. After
making these factual determinations, the district court concluded that Arwould render application useless); Holsey v. Armour & Co., 743 F.2d 199, 208, 209 (4th Cir.
1984) (recognizing that, in supporting employment discrimination claim, employee need not
have applied for position where potential applicants generally knew of employer's discriminatory
policy).
121. See, e.g., Asbury v. Broyham, 866 F.2d 1276, 1279 (10th Cir. 1989) (applying fair
employment law's prima facie proof test of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792
(1973), to fair housing law); Selden Apartments v. HUD, 785 F.2d 152, 159 (6th Cir. 1986)
(same); Phiffer v. Proud Parrot Motor Hotel, Inc., 648 F.2d 548, 551 (9th Cir. 1980) (same).
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mistead's policy injured Pinchback even though Pinchback did not apply
for a leasehold in the community and suffer a rejection. Accordingly, the
court awarded Pinchback $2,500 in compensatory damages, attorney's fees,
and costs, and the court further ordered injunctive relief to eliminate
Armistead's discriminatory policy.
Armistead appealed, challenging first the factual findings of the district
court. Armistead argued that the evidence failed to show that Armistead
actually refused to admit a black person. According to. Armistead, such
evidence is necessary to determine if black applicants and white applicants
are treated differently. Armistead also argued that the evidence only showed
prejudice on the part of certain individuals in the community, but not on
the part of the community as a whole. In responding to these arguments,
the Fourth Circuit referred to the testimony of two former members of
Armistead's governing board regarding specific evidence of the governing
board's discrimination. For example, the two former board members testified that the board, at its regular meetings, discussed strategies aimed at
keeping blacks out of the community. The Pinchback court also recounted
other specific instances of discriminatory conduct that, according to the
court, reflected Armistead's policy. The Fourth Circuit noted that Armistead's policy was effective in deterring blacks from ever becoming interested
in the community. Accepting the district court's findings in the record, the
Fourth Circuit rejected Armistead's argument regarding the facts.
Armistead next argued that the district court improperly extended the
futile gesture doctrine of fair employment law to Pinchback's section 1981
and 1982 housing claims. To analyze the futile gesture doctrine, the Fourth
Circuit referred to InternationalBrotherhood of Teamsters v. United States,
431 U.S. 324 (1977), which recognized the futile gesture doctrine in fair
employment law. In Teamsters a company discriminatorily had rejected
employees in the employees' applications for promotions. Other employees,
however, did not even apply because the employees knew of the company's
discriminatory practices. The company argued that these latter employees
should not recover because these employees had not actually applied and
thus had not directly suffered harm. The Supreme Court reasoned that a
person who does not engage in the futile gesture of applying for a promotion
is a victim just as a person who actually "goes through the motions" of
applying. The Supreme Court determined that those employees who would
have applied for a promotion but for actual knowledge of discriminatory
practices also should be entitled to recovery. The Fourth Circuit in Pinchback then noted the significant role of the futile gesture doctrine in fair
employment law today.
In affirming the district court's application of the futile gesture doctrine
to housing claims, the Fourth Circuit recognized that courts often adopt
fair employment concepts to fair housing law. Armistead argued, however,
that the futile gesture doctrine is unworkable in typical housing claims
because a nonapplicant does not have the same relationship with the
corporation in the housing context as the nonapplicant in the employment
context who is somehow connected to the employer. Because the nonappli-
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cant in the employment context likely is connected to the employer, the
nonapplicant's source of information about the discriminatory policy is
oftentimes the employer. In the housing context, however, Armistead asserted that a nonapplicant is less likely to receive the information directly
from someone officially tied to the corporation. Such information may not
be as accurate as information from sources closely tied to the one engaging
in the discrimination. Thus, according to Armistead, extension of the futile
gesture doctrine to fair housing claims would lead to frivolous litigation by
those without accurate knowledge of discrimination.
Rejecting Armistead's argument, the Fourth Circuit reasoned that the
elements that the district court regarded as necessary to establish a fair
housing violation through application of the futile gesture doctrine would
safeguard against frivolous litigation. The Fourth Circuit reiterated the futile
gesture doctrine's elements which the district court formulated for fair
housing claims. First, a plaintiff must be a member of a racial minority
who was a potential bona fide purchaser with the financial ability to buy
at the time the property was offered for sale. Second, the plaintiff must
show that the owner of the property discriminated against members of the
plaintiff's race. Third, the plaintiff must show that the plaintiff had reliable
information about the discriminatory policy and that the plaintiff would
have attempted to purchase the property but for the discriminatory policy.
Finally, the plaintiff must show that the owner in fact would have discriminated against the plaintiff had the plaintiff attempted to purchase the
property.
According to the district court and the Fourth Circuit, Pinchback
satisfied all of these elements. Recognizing that the "burden of humiliation
is heavy," the Fourth Circuit concluded that a court should not require
Pinchback "to press on meaninglessly" and actually apply for the leasehold.
The Fourth Circuit asserted that Pinchback, who possessed reliable information of Armistead's discriminatory policy which deterred her from applying to Armistead, is as much a victim as those people who actually
approached Armistead. The Fourth Circuit, therefore, affirmed the district
court's extension of the futile gesture doctrine to fair housing law.
As a final argument, Armistead contended that the district court erred
in awarding the compensatory damages of $2,500. Pinchback earlier had
agreed to a consent decree and release of claims against all defendants to
the action except Armistead in exchange for $4,000. Pinchback specifically
reserved her claim against Armistead in the consent decree. Armistead argued
that, under a Maryland statute, the amount of settlement by one tortfeasor
must offset the amount of future awards against unreleased joint tortfeasors.
Thus, under the Maryland statute, the court should apply the $4,000
settlement toward the $2,500 award, thus reducing Armistead's monetary
liability to zero. The Fourth Circuit rejected this argument because the
district court did not base the award on violations of Maryland state law.
Instead, the district court had determined that the violations of federal law
under sections 1981 and 1982 supported the $2,500 award. Furthermore,
the Pinchback court asserted that the effect of Pinchback's release of her
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federal claims against the other defendants on her claim against Armistead
presents a federal law question. Because no federal equivalent to the
Maryland statute exists, and because Pinchback did not intend for the
release to affect Pinchback's claim against Armistead, the Fourth Circuit
determined that Pinchback was entitled to the full $2,500 in compensatory
damages.
In affirming the judgment of the United States District Court of
Maryland with respect to the futile gesture doctrine, the Fourth Circuit
accepted the district court's extension of fair employment law's futile gesture
doctrine to fair housing law. Significantly, the district court considered the
issue of whether to extend the futile gesture doctrine to a fair housing claim
as an issue of first impression.'2 Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit affirmed
the district court's extension of the futile gesture doctrine without citing
any other courts that had ruled on this particular issue. Though courts have
adopted other fair employment concepts into fair housing law, the Fourth
Circuit apparently is the first circuit to extend the futile gesture doctrine to
fair housing law. The United States Supreme Court subsequently denied
certiorari in Armistead Homes Corp. v. Pinchback, 59. U.S.L.W. 3391
(1990).
Title V, section 7703 of the United States Code (section 7703) provides
for judicial review, upon the request of an adversely affected party, of the
Merit Systems Protection Board's (MSPB) actions. Section 7703(b)(2) requires that individuals seeking judicial review of the MSPB's decisions in
discrimination cases file actions in federal district court under one or more
of three federal antidiscrimination statutes.'2 The section also requires that
a claimant file such a suit not later than thirty days after the claimant
receives notice of the MSPB's judicially reviewable action. Prior to 1989,
five Federal Courts of Appeals had considered the issue of whether a district
court can have subject matter jurisdiction over an action arising under
section 7703 if the claimant has failed to file the action within the thirty
day period set forth in section 7703(b)(2). Of these five circuits, three held
that the claimant must file within the thirty day period for the district court
to assume jurisdiction over the case 2 4 and two left the question unanswered.'2 None of the circuits found that the thirty day limit was not a

122. Pinchback v. Armistead Homes Corp., 689 F. Supp. 541, 553 (D. Md. 1988).
123. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2). The section provides that:
Cases of discrimination ... shall be filed under section 717(c) of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c)), section 15(c) of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967 (29 U.S.C. 633a(c)), and section 16(b) of the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938, as amended (29 U.S.C. 216(b)), as applicable.
124. See Hilliard v. United States Postal Serv., 814 F.2d 325, 327 (6th Cir. 1987) (holding
that section 7703(b)(2)'s thirty day limitations period is jurisdictional prerequisite to review of
MSPB action in district court); King v. Dole, 782 F.2d 274, 275-77 (D.C. Cir.) (same), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 859 (1986); Lofton v. Heckler, 781 F.2d 1390, 1392 (9th Cir. 1986) (same).
125. See James v. United States Postal Serv., 835 F.2d 1265, 1267 (8th Cir. 1988)
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jurisdictional requirement. In Johnson v. Burnley, 887 F.2d 471 (4th Cir.
1989), the Fourth Circuit considered whether a claimant's failure to file an
appeal from a MSPB decision within section 7703(b)(2)'s thirty day time
limit foreclosed federal subject matter jurisdiction over the action.
During 1985 and 1986, the appellant, Margaret F. Johnson, repeatedly
had been tardy and absent without excuse from her secretarial job at a
United States Coast Guard facility in North Carolina. When, after several
warnings, reprimands, and one suspension, Johnson continued to arrive late
for work, the Coast Guard dismissed her. Johnson subsequently appealed
her dismissal to the MSPB, which sustained the dismissal.
Pursuant to section 7703(b)(2), Johnson then filed suit in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, seeking
review of the MSPB decision. Johnson alleged that she had been subjected
to sex discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. section 2000e (section 2000e). Johnson also claimed that,
in dismissing her, the Coast Guard had ignored certain internal personnel
procedures in violation of section 7703(c)(2). Although Johnson had originally filed her complaint within the thirty day statutory filing period, she
initially failed to include the Secretary of Transportation (the Secretary) as
a party to the action, as required by section 2000e-16(c). 26 Johnson later
amended her complaint to include the Secretary as a defendant, but did so
after the thirty day period had expired.
Because of Johnson's failure to timely file a proper complaint, the
district court suggested that it might lack subject matter jurisdiction under
section 7703(b)(2). However, the court reserved the jurisdictional question,
finding the merits to be dispositive of the action. The court then granted
summary judgment on the merits in favor of the government, holding that
Johnson had failed to present sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie
case of discrimination. The district court further reasoned that even if
Johnson had established a prima facie case of discrimination, her evidence
was insufficient as a matter of law to overcome the government's showing
that it had fired Johnson for a valid nondiscriminatory reason-Johnson's
continual lateness.
Johnson appealed the district court's decision to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. On appeal, Johnson argued that she had
established a prima facie case of sex discrimination. Johnson further asked
the Fourth Circuit to reverse the district court's judgment on the grounds
that the Coast Guard had failed to follow proper personnel procedures, and
that the MSPB improperly had refused to hear the testimony of certain of

(explaining that court need not decide whether section 7703(b)(2)'s thirty day filing limit is
jurisdictional because nothing in record warranted application of equitable tolling, even if limit
was nonjurisdictional); Lee v. United States Postal Serv., 774 F.2d 1067, 1068-69 & n.2 (11th

Cir. 1985) (same).
126. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c) (requiring that claimant filing action pursuant to section
2000e-5 name as defendant head of agency, department, or unit responsible for claimant's

employment).
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Johnson's witnesses. The government responded that Johnson's appeal
should be dismissed because Johnson's failure to file a proper complaint
within the thirty day period mandated by section 7703(b)(2) prohibited the
district court from assuming jurisdiction over the matter.
Choosing to address first the question of jurisdiction, the Fourth Circuit
examined the mandatory wording of section 7703(b)(2). That section uses
the phrase "must be filed" to describe the claimant's duty to file her action
within thirty days of receiving notice of the MSPB's final action. Relying
on Brock v. Pierce County, 476 U.S. 253, 258-62 (1986), the court held
that the statute's use of mandatory language does not cause the thirty day
filing limit to be a jurisdictional requirement. The Fourth Circuit also relied
on Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, 455 U.S. 385, 393 (1982), in which the
Supreme Court found a similar Title VII filing limit using the phrase "shall
be filed" to be nonjurisdictional.
The Fourth Circuit then considered the purpose behind Congress' incorporation of the three antidiscrimination statutes into section 7703(b)(2).
The court concluded that the incorporation of the three statutes signaled
Congress' intent that courts interpret section 7703(b)(2)'s filing deadline as
flexibly as courts interpret the deadlines found in the incorporated statutes.
The court then looked to section 2000e-16(c), which imposes a thirty day
filing deadline upon anyone wishing, immediately after an adverse action
by one of the departments, agencies, or units listed in the statute, to file a
discrimination suit in federal court. The court found no indication that
Congress intended that claimants filing discrimination suits pursuant to
section 7703 be treated more harshly than claimants filing only under section
2000e-16(c) merely because the section 7703 claimants first appeal to the
MSPB while the section 2000e-16(c) claimants do not do so. Therefore, the
court reasoned, if the filing deadline in section 2000e-16(c) is nonjurisdictional, then the thirty day limit in section 7703(b)(2) similarly must be
nonjurisdictional.
While the Supreme Court has not ruled on the nature of the section
2000e-16(c) filing deadline, the Fourth Circuit noted that five United States
Circuit Courts of Appeals have held the limit to be nonjurisdictional, 27
while three have held that the limit is jurisdictional. 28 However, in Crown,
Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 349 n.3 (1983), the Supreme

127. See Warren v. Department of Army, 867 F.2d 1156, 1158 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding
section 2000e-16(c)'s thirty day filing limit does not constitute jurisdictional requirement);
Mondy v. Secretary of Army, 845 F.2d 1051, 1055-56 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (same); Hornsby v.
United States Postal Serv., 787 F.2d 87, 89 (3d Cir. 1986) (same); Martinez v. Orr, 738 F.2d
1107, 1110 (10th Cir. 1984) (same); Milam v. United States Postal Serv., 674 F.2d 860, 862
(11th Cir. 1982) (same).
128. See Williams v. United States Postal Serv., 873 F.2d 1069, 1074 (7th Cir 1989)
(holding that section 2000e-16(c)'s thirty day filing limit creates jurisdictional requirement);
Jordan v. Clark. 847 F.2d 1368, 1372 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that under section 2000e-16(c),
requirement that plaintiff name proper defendant within thirty day filing period is jurisdictional
requirement), cert. denied sub nom. Jordan v. Hodel, 109 S. Ct. 786 (1989).
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Court noted that the filing deadline in section 2000e-5(f)(1), which concerns
the filing of discrimination suits against private firms, is nonjurisdictional.
The Fourth Circuit asserted that the same characterization that applies to
section 2000e-5(f)(1) should apply to section 2000e-16(c). Relying on Aronberg v. Walters, 755 F.2d 1114, 1116 (4th Cir. 1985), the court reasoned
that Congress' extension of Title VII protection to government employees
in 1972 signaled Congress' desire that government workers have the same
overall protection as private sector workers. According to the Fourth Circuit,
in Martinez v. Orr, 738 F.2d 1107 (10th Cir. 1984), the Tenth Circuit found
that Congress intended that government workers bringing suit pursuant to
section 2000e-16(c) should have the same benefits of equitable tolling and
estoppel that their private sector counterparts enjoy under section 2000e5(0(1). Adopting the position set forth in Martinez, the Fourth Circuit
found the filing deadline in section 2000e-16(c) to be analogous to the
deadline in 2000e-5(f)(1). The court, therefore, found the section 2000-16(c)
filing deadline to be nonjurisdictional.
By further analogy, the Fourth Circuit next held that section 7703(b)(2)'s
thirty day limit also is nonjurisdictional. According to the court, the thirty
day limit should be treated as a statute of limitations, subject to the same
principles of equitable tolling and estoppel as the filing periods in the Title
VII statutes the court had examined. The court expressly reserved judgment
on the question of whether the limit would be considered nonjurisdictional
with regard to cases filed under the other two antidiscrimination statutes
incorporated into section 7703(b)(2)-the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act and the Fair Labor Standards Act.
The Fourth Circuit then examined the language in section 7703(b)(2)
which states that the thirty day limit should apply "[nlotwithstanding any
other provision of law." The court denied that the phrase was intended to
prevent courts from referring to the incorporated antidiscrimination statutes
to determine whether or not the filing limit was jurisdictional. The court
found that Congress' purpose in including the phrase in the statute was not
to prevent courts from referring to analogous filing deadlines for interpretation, but merely to stress that the deadline was not longer than thirty
days as might be provided for in one of the three incorporated antidiscrimination statutes. The Fourth Circuit, therefore, affirmed the district court's
exercise of jurisdiction over the matter.
After affirming the jurisdictional issue, the Fourth Circuit declined to
decide whether the plaintiff effectively could invoke equitable estoppel to
avoid the filing deadline. The court stated that, in any event, the merits
dictated affirmance of summary judgment in favor of the government. The
court drew upon Moore v. Charlotte, 754 F.2d 1100, 1105-06 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1021 (1985), to establish the two criteria necessary
for Johnson to make a prima facie showing of sex discrimination. Under
the Moore test, the claimant first must show that she engaged in a prohibited
act similar to that of a male counterpart. Second, the claimant must show
that the employer subjected the claimant to disciplinary actions that were
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more drastic than those taken against the male employees. While the court
found that Johnson had fulfilled the second requirement because Johnson
had been the only one at the Coast Guard facility dismissed for absences
and tardiness, the court also found that Johnson had failed to show that
other employees' infractions were as serious as her own. Although Johnson's
evidence indicated that certain other employees at the Coast Guard facility
had been late for work on occasion, no evidence demonstrated that any of
those employees, like Johnson, had continued to be late after repeated
reprimands and punishments. According to the court, Johnson had failed
to establish a prima facie case of sex discrimination. Consequently, the
Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's summary judgment on the merits
in favor of the government.
Johnson's final claim on appeal focused on three alleged procedural
defects in the course of her dismissal and appeal. First, Johnson asserted
that the MSPB refused to hear certain witnesses on both Johnson's discrimination and procedural claims. Second, Johnson claimed that the Coast
Guard violated its own personnel guidelines when Johnson's immediate
supervisor discussed Johnson's tardiness with the Commander responsible
for making the ultimate decision regarding Johnson's dismissal. Third,
Johnson claimed that her supervisors considered approved absences in
deciding to fire Johnson.
Addressing Johnson's claim of procedural flaws in both her dismissal
and her appeal, the Fourth Circuit explained that .its decision in Rana v.
United States, 812 F.2d 887, 889 n.'1 (4th Cir. 1987), dictated that claimants
seeking review of administrative action on discrimination claims in district
court are entitled to a trial de novo. Applying Rana, the court concluded
that Johnson had the right to present at her trial in the district court any
witnesses excluded by the MSPB. However, because Johnson did not attempt
to present these witnesses at trial, the Fourth Circuit held that Johnson had
no basis for appeal on this claim. Although Johnson had no right to a trial
de novo on her procedural claim, she produced no evidence that any of the
excluded witnesses would have offered testimony germane to the procedural
claim. The court, therefore, refused to overturn the summary judgment on
the basis of the exclusion of these witnesses.
The Fourth Circuit then addressed Johnson's claim that the Coast
Guard violated one of its own personnel rules, under which the officer
designated to make the final decision regarding an employee's punishment
may not be involved in making the recommendation to initiate punitive
action. Because Johnson offered no evidence that she would have been
treated more leniently if the prohibited consultation had not taken place,
the court found the violation not to be harmful error as the MSPB
regulations define the term "harmful error.' '1 29 Regarding Johnson's final
procedural claim, the court found that Johnson failed to produce evidence
129. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.56(c)(3) (1988) (defining harmful error as error by agency in
applying internal procedures that, if error had not occurred, likely would have caused agency
to make decision different from decision actually made).
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that her supervisors would have made a different decision regarding her
dismissal if they had not taken into consideration approved absences. Having
rejected all of Johnson's claims, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district
court's judgment.
Judge Gordon dissented from the majority's opinion. Judge Gordon
stressed Congress' failure to express any legislative intention that section
7703(b)(2)'s thirty day filing period be construed as anything but mandatory
and jurisdictional. In light of this failure, Judge Gordon suggested that the
court should have followed the plain mandatory language of the statute.
Further, Judge Gordon argued that the "notwithstanding" language of
section 7703(b)(2) plainly means that courts should not look to the analogous
filing limits in the incorporated antidiscrimination statutes in interpreting
section 7703(b)(2). Judge Gordon found the deadline to be jurisdictional
and would have dismissed the appeal.
The Fourth Circuit's opinion in Johnson is in direct contravention of
the opinion of every other Federal Court of Appeals that has ruled on the
nature of section 7703(b)(3)'s thirty day filing limit.130 The court seemed to
be willing to go to any length to overrule the explicit language of the
statute, even without relevant legislative history to back up the statutory
interpretation. The decision is especially perplexing in light of the fact that,
because the merits were dispositive, the court did not need to reach the
jurisdictional issue to affirm the district court's dismissal of the case.
Ultimately, Johnson may open the door for courts within the Fourth Circuit
to ignore explicit mandatory language in time limitation statutes by analyzing
a string of purportedly analogous statutes until one that has been held
nonjurisdictional is found.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964131 (Title VII) prohibits both
overt and functional employment discrimination. In Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), the Supreme Court determined that although an
employment practice may be facially nondiscriminatory, the practice may
be functionally discriminatory if the practice has a disparate impact on a
protected group. In Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982), the Court
developed a three-part analysis for courts to apply in weighing disparate
impact claims. First, a prima facie case of disparate impact must demonstrate
a significantly discriminatory impact. Second, even if the plaintiff establishes
a prima facie case, the employer may demonstrate that the contested
requirement has a manifest relationship to the employment in question.
Finally, the plaintiff may overcome the employer's showing of a manifest
relationship by demonstating that the employer was using the practice as a
mere pretext for discrimination. In Walls v. City of Petersburg, 895 F.2d
130. See Williams, 873 F.2d at 1074 (holding that section 2000e-16(c)'s thirty day filing
limit creates jurisdictional requirement); Jordan 847 F.2d at 1372 (holding that under section
2000e-16(c), requirement that plaintiff name proper defendant within thirty day filing period
is jurisdictional requirement).
131. Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§ 701-18, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1983).
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188 (4th Cir. 1990), the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit considered whether an employment questionnaire that elicits
more negative responses from blacks than whites constitutes a valid claim
under Title VII.
In addition to the disparate impact issue, the Walls court considered a
privacy issue that Walls raised under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 (1981). The
Supreme Court has recognized a right of privacy extending both to the
freedom to make certain personal decisions without governmental interference and to the interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters. 3 2 Privacy
questions are subject to a two-part analysis.'33 First, the information must
fall within the scope of the right of privacy. Second, a compelling governmental interest may outweigh the individual's interest in privacy and allow
disclosure. Based on the two-part privacy analysis, theo Walls court considered whether the right to privacy protects information concerning homosexual conduct, marital history, criminal history of family members, and
financial information that an employment background questionnaire elicited
from prospective employees.
In Walls, Walls was the administrator of a alternative sentencing program for non-violent criminals. The program was transferred from the City
Manager's office to the Bureau of Police (Bureau). After the transfer, the
police department required all program employees to undergo a background
check, including completing a background questionnaire. Objecting to four
questions in particular, Walls refused to fill out the questionnaire. The four
questions that Walls disputed concerned the criminal history of Walls'
family, her marital history, including divorces, annulments, separations, and
children, past homosexual relations, and financial information concerning
outstanding debts. Because of Walls' refusal to complete the questionnaire,
the City Manager terminated Walls. Walls sued the city of Petersburg (the
city) on two grounds. First, Walls alleged a violation of Title VII, claiming
that the questionnaire had a disparate discriminatory impact on blacks.
Second, Walls alleged a violation of section 1983, claiming that the discharge
violated her constitutional right of privacy, freedom of association, and due
process. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia
granted summary judgment for the city on both causes of action.
132. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977) (recognizing right of privacy to
make certain decisions and to avoid disclosure of personal matters).
133. See Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 684-86 (1977) (analyzing privacy
question by determining whether information falls within scope of privacy and questioning
whether compelling governmental interest exists); Walls v. City of Petersburg, 895 F.2d 188,
192 (questioning whether information is within individual's reasonable expectation of confidentiality and analyzing compelling state interest). The Walls court drew an interpretation of
the test from a Third Circuit case that enunciated a reasonable expectation of confidentiality
prong. See Fraternal Order of Police v. Philadelphia, 812 F.2d 105, 112 (3d Cir. 1987)
(requiring that information fall within individual's reasonable expectation of privacy). However,
the FraternalOrder of Police Court cited to a prior Third Circuit case that required only that
the information fall within a zone of privacy entitled to protection. See U.S. v. Westinghouse,
638 F.2d 570 (3d Cir. 1980) (requiring that information fall within zone of privacy entitled to
protection).
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With regard to the disparate impact claim, the Fourth Circuit applied
both Griggs and Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988).
In Watson the Supreme Court held that statistical disparities are insufficient
to establish a prima facie case of disparate impact, absent proof of an
adverse effect on employment decisions concerning a protected group.'3
Walls submitted statistical evidence showing that blacks were much more
likely than whites to have negative responses to the four disputed questions.
However, Walls' evidence provided no connection between the statistics and
any of the city's personnel decisions. The Walls court, therefore, held that
Walls' claim that she would have been subject to some adverse employment
action had she filled out the questionnaire was mere speculation. According
to the Fourth Circuit, speculation will not substitute for a demonstration
of actual disparate impact.
The Walls court also addressed Walls' second claim that the questionnaire violated Walls' constitutional right to privacy pursuant to section 1983.
The Fourth Circuit first addressed the question concerning homosexual
conduct. The court noted that Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986),
held that the constitutional right to privacy does not protect private sexual
13
conduct, and specifically homosexual conduct, from state regulation. 1
Relying on Bowers, the Fourth Circuit held that the constitutional right of
privacy does not preclude an employer from asking questions concerning
homosexual conduct. The Walls court then considered Walls' contention
that the constitutional right to privacy precludes an employer from asking
questions concerning marital history, separations, and children. The court
reasoned that because marital history was available in public records, the
right to privacy does not preclude an employer from soliciting information
concerning marital history, separations, or children, except to the extent
that the information is not publicly available. The Walls court applied
similar reasoning to the criminal history of Walls' family. Because criminal
history is available as part of the public record, the employee can have no
reasonable expectation of privacy concerning the criminal history. Therefore,
the constitutional right to privacy does not preclude the employer from
asking questions concerning criminal history of family members. Finally,
the Fourth Circuit considered whether an employee's financial information
is protected by the right to privacy. The Walls court held that the right to
privacy does extend to an employee's financial information. The court,
however, applied the second part of the privacy analysis to determine
whether the city had a compelling interest for inquiring into Walls' financial

134. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 992-93 (1988) (plurality
opinion by O'Connor, J.) (holding that statistical disparities are insufficient absent showing
of exclusion to prove disparate impact); Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115,
2124 (1989) (requiring showing that employment practices cause disparity).
135. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190-91 (1986) (holding that constitutional
right to privacy does not cover homosexual sodomy). The Court distinguished homosexual
sodomy from a line of cases which had conferred a right to privacy for child rearing and
education, family relationships, procreation, marriage, and contraception. Id. at 190.
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information. The court noted that the city had a strong interest in avoiding
corruption. The court reasoned that because Walls' position dealt directly
with the sentencing and disposition of criminals, Walls' position was susceptible to corruption. Thus, the Walls court held that the city had a
compelling interest to avoid corruption that overrode Walls' right to privacy.
The Fourth Circuit's decision in Walls, that Walls had not established
a prima facie disparate impact case, establishes and clarifies the elements
necessary to make a disparate impact claim. While acknowledging the
importance of statistical evidence in demonstrating disparate impact, the
Walls court nevertheless required the plaintiff to show adversity arising
from the disparate effect. Because the plaintiff must show a causal link
between an employer's actions and disparate impact to make a prima facie
case of disparate impact, the plaintiff's statistical evidence must show that
the disputed practice has caused the exclusion of applicants because of
membership in a protected group. 3 6 The Fourth Circuit's conclusion that
speculation as to adverse effects on a protected group is insufficient to
establish a prima facie case is a natural corollary to the causation requirement that the Supreme Court outlined in Watson. The United States Court
of Appeals for the First Circuit has applied the causation requirement in a
similar fashion in concluding that plaintiffs fail to demonstrate a prima
facie case when plaintiffs fail
to demonstrate that hiring practices caused
13 7
the exclusion of applicants.
The Walls court's conclusion that the right to privacy does not protect
information concerning homosexual conduct, marital history, criminal history of an employee's family, and financial status is open to greater dispute.
A pre-Bowers Ninth Circuit case cited by the Fourth Circuit in Walls held
that inquiry by a police department into an applicant's sexual history was
an invasion of privacy.13 8 However, a post-Bowers court would be unlikely
to conclude that the questioning implicated privacy. 3 9 The marital history
and criminal history categories of interests are equally unlikely to be
challenged due to the availability of public records which negate the privacy
interest. With respect to financial information, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit has concluded that financial disclosure
served the important public interest of accountability. 4° Therefore, the right
136. See Watson, 487 U.S. at 994 (holding that plaintiff must prove link between
employment practice and exclusion of applicants); Abbott v. Federal Forge, Inc., 912 F.2d

867, 872 (6th Cir. 1990) (applying Watson criteria); Walls v. City of Petersburg, 895 F.2d
188, 191 (4th Cir. 1990) (same).
137. See Lowe v. Commack Union Free School Dist., 886 F.2d 1364, 1370 (1st Cir. 1989),

cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1470 (1990) (holding that plaintiff's failed in prima facie burdens by
failing to demonstrate that disputed employment practice caused exclusion of applicants for
jobs).

138. See Thorne v. City of El Segundo, 726 F.2d 459, 469-70 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 979 (1984) (finding that questions asked of female applicant of police department
concerning sexual history was violation of right to privacy).
139. See Fleisher v. City of Signal Hill, 829 F.2d 1491, 1497-99 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding
that right of privacy does not extend to employee's illegal sexual behavior).
140. See Igneri v. Moore, 898 F.2d 870, 877 (2d Cir. 1990) (upholding statute requiring

financial disclosure for city employees as furthering important governmental interest).
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to privacy holding in Walls is in accord with the general principles of a
right to privacy analysis.
The Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act of 1966,
42 U.S.C. section 3301-3374 (Model Cities Act), provided cities with federal

funding for urban renewal projects approved by the Department of Housing
and Urban Development (HUD). 141 The Model Cities Act required participating cities to provide maximum employment opportunities and better work
and training opportunities for the residents of the participating cities.142
Recently, courts have tried to determine whether Congress intended for the
Model Cities Act to create a private cause of action allowing employees
hired under the Model Cities Act to enforce their rights to civil service

status and pension credit. Courts also have attempted to determine whether
employees can use 42 U.S.C. section 1983"41 (section 1983) to redress state
agents' alleged violations of the Model Cities Act. 44 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in Members of BridgeportHousing
Authority Police Force v. Bridgeport, 646 F.2d 55 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,

454 U.S. 897 (1981), held that the statutory rights created under the Model
Cities Act were enforceable through section 1983. On the same day the
Second Circuit handed down its Bridgeport opinion, the United States
Supreme Court decided the case of PennhurstState School and Hospital v.
Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981), which clarified the issue of congressional
141. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3374. The pertinent part of the Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act of 1966 (Model Cities Act), § 3301, provides that:
The Congress ... finds ... that cities do not have adequate resources to deal
effectively with the critical problems facing them, and that Federal assistance ... is
essential to enable cities to plan, develop, and conduct programs to improve their
physical environment....
The purposes of this subchapter are to provide additional financial and technical
assistance to enable cities of all sizes ... to plan, develop, and carry out locally
prepared and scheduled comprehensive city demonstration programs ... to expand
housing, job, and income opportunities ... and generally to improve living conditions for the people who live in such areas, and to accomplish these objectives
through the most effective and economical concentration and coordination of Federal,
State, and local public and private efforts to improve the quality of urban life.
Congress omitted §§ 3301-13 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 5316 and terminated the authority to
make grants or loans under the Model Cities Act after January 1, 1975. 42 U.S.C. § 5316
(1988).
142. 42 U.S.C. § 3303(a)(2).
143. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). Section 1983 provides in pertinent part that:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit
in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
Id.
144. See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980) (holding that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 encompasses
claims based not only upon violations of constitutional law but also upon purely statutory
violations of federal law).
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intent to create enforceable section 1983 interests. In 1987, the Court in
Wright v. Roanoke Redevelopment and Housing Authority, 479 U.S. 418
(1987), refined the holding of Pennhurst. During the same year, the Fourth
Circuit, in Smith v. Kirk, 821 F.2d 980 (4th Cir. 1987), also refined the
scope of enforceable section 1983 interests. Armed with these three opinions
unavailable to the Bridgeport court, the Fourth Circuit, in Former Special
Project Employees Association v. Norfolk, 909 F.2d 89 (4th Cir. 1990),
addressed the issue of whether the Model Cities Act created a private cause
of action or enforceable section 1983 interests.
In Former Employees the plaintiffs, fifty-seven individual members of
the Former Special Project Employees Association (the Association), contended that they were entitled to retroactive civil service status and pension
credit under the Model Cities Act. The Model Cities Act had provided
funding to the City of Norfolk, Virginia, in 1969. Norfolk used the funding
to establish a centralized administrative unit, consisting of employees known
as special project employees, to implement the programs of the Model Cities
Act. The special project employees were employed outside of the city's
regular civil service structure. Additionally, under the statutorily granted
authority of the Model Cities Act, HUD issued further requirements regarding the special project employees. HUD believed that these requirements
were necessary to advance the purposes of the Model Cities Act. HUD
circulated these additional requirements through pronouncements known as
Community Development Act Letters (CDA Letters). In CDA Letter 2,
HUD stated that the special project employees should receive the same
fringe benefits that were standard for other civil service employees. In CDA
Letter 11, HUD required the participating cities to incorporate special project
employees into the cities' regular civil service systems within two years from
the time the cities filled the special positions. However, HUD later issued
a series of memoranda, applicable to Norfolk, which waived some of the
requirements contained in CDA Letter 11. When Norfolk's Model Cities
Act program ended in 1974, some special project employees were transferred
to regular civil service positions, while another group of special project
employees was transferred to jobs under two other federal programs. This
latter group of special project employees, along with other employees
subsequently hired under the two federal programs, comprised the Association. Norfolk did not incorporate the members of the Association into the
city's retirement system until 1982, and Association members did not receive
regular civil service status until 1985 and 1986.
The Association filed suit in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia, claiming that its members were entitled to
retroactive civil service status with full employee benefits, on the ground
that the Model Cities Act created a private cause of action to enforce the
rights HUD had established in CDA Letters 2 and 11. The Association also
claimed that the Model Cities Act created statutory rights that were enforceable under section 1983. Finding no implied private cause of action under
the Model Cities Act, the district court stated that even if the CDA Letters
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had created rights to pension credit and civil service status, Norfolk was
not bound by the content of the CDA Letters because of HUD's subsequent
waiver memoranda. The district court did not address the issue of whether
the Model Cities Act created rights enforceable under section 1983. The
Association appealed the district court's dismissal of the complaint to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. The Association
sought declaratory and injunctive relief under the Model Cities Act.
To begin its analysis, the Fourth Circuit considered whether Congress
intended, when it passed the Model Cities Act, to create a private cause of
action. The Fourth Circuit examined the factors listed in Cort v. Ash, 422
U.S. 66 (1975), to determine when a private cause of action may be implied
in a federal statute. Under the first Cort factor, the plaintiff must show
that the statute creates a federal right in favor of the plaintiff. Under the
second Cort factor, the plaintiff must prove that Congress intended to
create a private cause of action. Under the third Cort factor, the plaintiff
must demonstrate that implying a private cause of action is consistent with
the underlying purposes of the statute. Finally, under the fourth Cort factor,
the plaintiff must show that the cause of action is not one traditionally
relegated to state law, so that it is appropriate for a court to infer the
existence of a cause of action based solely on federal law. The Supreme
Court explained in Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 57576 (1979), that each of the Cort factors is not necessarily entitled to equal
weight. When the focus of the inquiry is to determine congressional intent,
Touche Ross holds that only the first three Cort factors are relevant.
Examining whether the statute created a right in favor of the plaintiff,
the first Cort factor, the Fourth Circuit in Former Employees found that
Congress did not intend to benefit the Association's members when it passed
the Model Cities Act. According to the Fourth Circuit, the main inquiry
does not simply concern who would benefit, but whether Congress intended
to grant federal rights to those beneficiaries. The court examined the
statutory language of the Model Cities Act and concluded that Congress'
intended beneficiaries were the cities participating in the program, not the
employees hired under the program. The Fourth Circuit then reasoned that
any benefits the employees received were merely incidental and that the
existence of these benefits did not indicate that Congress intended to provide
a private cause of action. After characterizing the Model Cities Act as a
funding statute, the Fourth Circuit held that because funding statutes do
not directly focus on a specific beneficiary, the Model Cities Act did not
confer a private cause of action on any class of individuals.
Examining the second Cort factor, whether evidence of congressional
intent to create a private cause of action exists, the Fourth Circuit found
nothing in the statutory language or legislative history of the Model Cities
Act indicating any such intent. The Fourth Circuit refused to imply a private
cause of action in the absence of any evidence of congressional intent.
Examining the third Cort factor, whether a private cause of action is
consistent with the underlying purpose of the statute, the FormerEmployees
court recognized that the typical remedy for failure to comply with the
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conditions of a funding statute, such as the Model Cities Act, is not the
creation of a private cause of action, but rather the federal government's
termination of the funding.
After concluding that Congress did not intend to create a private cause
of action when it passed the Model Cities Act, the FormerEmployees court
addressed the issue of whether the Association's members could enforce
their statutorily-created rights under section 1983. First, the Fourth Circuit
noted that a section 1983 remedy is unavailable if the statute itself does not
create enforceable rights, privileges, or immunities within the meaning of
section 1983. Examining the leading United States Supreme Court decisions,
the Fourth Circuit concluded that Congress did not intend to create an
enforceable section 1983 interest.
In Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1
(1981), the Supreme Court held that enforceable rights are not created if
Congress does not clearly indicate that the section of the statute containing
the rights creates a mandatory obligation for the participating governmental
entity. The Court stated that mere congressional encouragement that states
comply with the provisions of a statute does not sufficiently indicate that
Congress intended to create an enforceable section 1983 interest. In Wright
v. Roanoke Redevelopment and Housing Authority, 479 U.S. 418 (1987),
the Supreme Court expanded the Pennhurst inquiry. Wright held that,
before qualifying as enforceable section 1983 interests, statutorily-created
rights must be clear and specific so that courts can adequately enforce the
rights. Only upon a finding that the rights created by a federal statute are
clear and specific may a court then proceed with Pennhurst's inquiry of
whether Congress intended for the rights to be mandatory obligations on
participating governmental entities.
The Fourth Circuit found that the Model Cities Act satisfied the
Pennhurst requirement because the Model Cities Act imposed mandatory
obligations on participating cities. However, the Fourth Circuit held that
the Association's claim failed because the Model Cities Act did not meet
the Wright requirement of clarity and specificity. The Former Employees
court stated that rights to maximum employment opportunities were too
vague for the judiciary to enforce. Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit noted
that rights to better work and training opportunities did not include civil
service status and pension benefits.
Although the Fourth Circuit's decision in Former Special Project Employees Association v. Norfolk conflicts with the Second Circuit's holding
in Members of Bridgeport Housing Authority Police Force v. Bridgeport,
646 F.2d 55 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981), the Second Circuit
did not have the benefit of the Supreme Court's Pennhurst or Wright
decisions, or of the Fourth Circuit's opinion in Smith v. Kirk, 821 F.2d
980 (4th Cir. 1987). The Bridgeport court held that HUD's CDA Letter 11,
requiring participating cities to incorporate Model Cities Act employees into
the regular civil service system, created enforceable section 1983 interests.
However, in Smith v. Kirk, the Fourth Circuit held that an administrative
regulation cannot create an enforceable section 1983 interest not already
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existing within the federal statute itself. Because the Former Employees
court found that the Model Cities Act itself did not create an enforceable
section 1983 interest, HUD's CDA Letters were irrelevant. Former Employees is in accord with the current status of the law regarding enforceable
section 1983 interests, because the Fourth Circuit rendered its decision in
light of the mandatory obligation requirement of Pennhurst and the specificity requirement of Wright, Supreme Court opinions unavailable to the
Second Circuit in Bridgeport.
In Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 895 F.2d 195 (4th Cir.
1990), the Fourth Circuit, in an effort to determine whether the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. section 621-634 (1988) (ADEA),
was arbitrable, applied the Supreme Court's arbitrability test. In a trilogy
of recent cases, Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473
U.S. 614 (1985), Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S.
220 (1987), and Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc.,
109 S. Ct. 1917 (1989), the Supreme Court endorsed arbitration as an
effective and efficient means of dispute resolution. In Mitsubishi and
McMahon, the Court developed an arbitrability test to determine whether
4
an arbitration agreement is enforceable under a federal statute.' 1
The Court based its endorsement of arbitration on language in the
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. sections 1-14 (1988) that establishes
a federal policy favoring arbitration. In these decisions, the Court held that
under the FAA, enforcement of an arbitration agreement is equally appropriate regardless of whether the rights that parties have agreed to arbitrate
are contractual or statutory rights.
The Court ruled that the FAA, standing alone, mandates enforcement
of arbitration agreements. However, Congress can override the FAA mandate by indicating an intent to preclude waiver of the judicial forum for
the particular statutory right at issue. The Court stated that the burden of
showing that Congress intended to preclude waiver is on the party opposing
arbitration. According to the Supreme Court, courts can deduce congressional intent from the statute's text or legislative history, or from an inherent
conflict between arbitration and the statute's underlying purposes.
In Gilmer Interstate/Johnson Lane Corporation (Interstate) hired the
plaintiff in May 1981 as a manager of financial services. Following an
Interstate employment requirement, Gilmer registered as a securities representative with the New York Stock Exchange. Gilmer's application for
securities registration contained an arbitration clause, pursuant to which he
agreed to arbitrate any disputes between himself and his employer arising
out of his employment or the termination of his employment.
In November 1987, Interstate terminated Gilmer's employment. In August 1988, Gilmer sued Interstate in the United States District Court for
the Western District of North Carolina. Gilmer alleged that his termination
145. See Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226-27 (1987)
(citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 628, 632-37 (1985)).
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violated the ADEA. Interstate moved to compel arbitration as authorized
under the FAA. The district court denied Interstate's motion to compel
arbitration, reasoning that arbitration procedures were inadequate for the
final resolution of ADEA rights and that Congress intended to protect
ADEA plaintiffs from waiver of a judicial forum.
Interstate appealed, arguing that the Mitsubishi and McMahon arbitrability test mandates compulsory arbitration of ADEA claims. Addressing
Interstate's claim, the Fourth Circuit applied the Mitsubishi arbitrability test
and determined that neither the text nor the legislative history of the ADEA
reflects a congressional intent to preclude arbitration under the ADEA.
Additionally, the court found no conflict between arbitration and the
underlying congressional purposes of the ADEA. Therefore, the Fourth
Circuit compelled arbitration of Gilmer's ADEA claim.
Gilmer presented eight arguments to show that arbitration conflicted
with the expressed and underlying purposes of the ADEA. The Fourth
Circuit rejected all eight arguments. First, Gilmer argued that the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission's (EEOC) role in enforcement of
ADEA claims indicated a congressional intent to preclude waiver. Gilmer
asserted that if the courts forced an ADEA complainant to submit to
arbitration, the EEOC would be deprived of notification of the discriminatory conduct and could not attempt to remedy the conduct through
discussions with the employer. The Fourth Circuit disagreed, finding that
the EEOC's effectiveness did not depend upon, its participation in the
resolution of all ADEA claims. The court compared the lack of EEOC
involvement in arbitration to the lack of EEOC involvement in voluntary
claim settlement.
Second, Gilmer argued that the funding statute for the EEOC contained
a congressional intent to preclude waiver. The Fourth Circuit dismissed this
argument, stating that Congress referred in the funding statute only to a
prohibited waiver of ADEA substantive rights. According to the court,
Congress did not intend to preclude waiver of a procedural right such as
forum selection.
Third, Gilmer asserted that compelling arbitration would be inconsistent
with the ADEA's designation of initial adjudicatory authority in a court
rather than an agency. Rejecting this argument, the Fourth Circuit found
that the congressional choice of courts over agencies as the initial forum
for resolution of ADEA disputes had nothing to do with the congressional
attitude toward arbitration. The court reasoned that an arbitral forum,
unlike a court or an agency, is a forum selected by the agreement of the
parties involved in the dispute.
In his fourth argument, Gilmer stated that the courts' possession of
broader remedial powers than the remedial powers of arbitrators displayed
a congressional intent to preclude waiver. The court, however, stated that
a lack of equality in remedial power between the arbitrator and the court
is not fatal to arbitration. According to the court, an arbitrator is required
to possess only the equitable power necessary to remedy the dispute between
the employer and the employee. Concluding that ADEA litigants plainly
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were permitted to waive the right to a trial by jury, the Fourth Circuit also
dismissed Gilmer's fifth argument that he was entitled to a trial by jury.
In his sixth argument, Gilmer asserted that the liquidated damages
provision for willful violations under the ADEA reflected a congressional
intent to preclude waiver of a judicial forum. Finding no reason why an
ADEA dispute arbitrator could not award liquidated damages if the arbitrator found a willful statutory violation, the Fourth Circuit rejected the
argument. Gilmer further contended that the court could not enforce the
arbitration agreement because the agreement constituted a prospective waiver.
Finding this argument inconsistent with the law, the court cited Mitsubishi,
McMahon, and Rodriguez as precedent that clearly approved prospective
waiver.
Finally, the court found no reason to assume that ADEA claims are
inherently incompatible with arbitration. The court stated that ADEA claims
are much less complex than the Sherman Act claims of Mitsubishi and the
RICO claims of McMahon. According to the Gilmer court, an arbitrator
must only decide the straightforward factual issue of whether a particular
employee was maltreated because of age.
Thus, after applying the Mitsubishi arbitrability test, the Fourth Circuit
held that Gilmer must arbitrate his ADEA claim. Circuit Judge Widener
filed a dissenting opinion. Judge Widener found no distinction between
compulsory arbitration of ADEA disputes and the Supreme Court's opinion
in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974), in which the
Court found Title VII employment discrimination claims nonarbitrable.
Judge Widener advocated that the court declare the ADEA nonarbitrable
for three reasons.
First, Judge Widener reasoned that the ADEA preserves an employment
discrimination plaintiff's right to a trial by jury. Second, the dissenting
judge suggested that due to the similarity of ADEA and Title VII protection,
the Gilmer majority opinion is contrary to the Supreme Court opinion in
Alexander. According to Judge Widener, because the Supreme Court in
Alexander disallowed prospective waiver of an employee's Title VII rights,
the Fourth Circuit should deny prospective waiver of an employee's ADEA
rights. Third, Judge Widener stated that the Fourth Circuit failed to give
the Supreme Court proper credit for its knowledge of the law. According
to Judge Widener, although the Supreme Court in Alexander did not
explicitly mention the FAA, the Court was aware of and did mention a
federal policy favoring arbitration. Gilmer subsequently petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari. The Court granted certiorari and heard arguments in the case on January 14, 1991.
The Fourth Circuit's Gilmer decision created a split in the circuits. The
Third Circuit, in Nicholson v. CPC International, Inc., 877 F.2d 221 (3d
Cir. 1989), refused to enforce arbitration of an ADEA claim. Although
both the Third and Fourth Circuits applied the Mitsubishi and McMahon
arbitrability test to the ADEA, each circuit reached a different conclusion
regarding whether a court must compel arbitration of an age discrimination
claim pursuant to an individual arbitration agreement.
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Applying the test of arbitrability, the Third Circuit in Nicholson concluded that neither the text nor the legislative history of the ADEA reflect
a clear congressional intent to preclude waiver of judicial remedies under
the ADEA.'4 After applying the third prong of the test of arbitrability, the
Third Circuit in Nicholson found an inherent conflict between arbitration
and two statutory schemes of the ADEA.
Specifically, the Third Circuit found that Congress clearly intended for
a public agency to oversee ADEA claims. 47 The court found not only that
the EEOC should attempt to settle specific age discrimination disputes, but
also that the EEOC should set a goal to eliminate age discrimination in the
workplace. The Third Circuit reasoned that arbitration would keep the
EEOC from witnessing certain ADEA violations that might require the
EEOC to propose amendments to the law. The court acknowledged that
employees, even if they had submitted to arbitration, could go to the EEOC
and file a complaint to vindicate the public interest. However, the court
stated that aggrieved employees likely would not file a complaint because
the employees' interests in personal compensation for the discriminatory
conduct could only be served by arbitration.
The Nicholson court also found that an arbitrator possesses inadequate
remedial and enforcement power and cannot effectively remedy ADEA
disputes. The Third Circuit noted that only courts possess the authority to
issue injunctions. Therefore, the Nicholas court concluded that because the
power of the arbitrator does not extend beyond the individual employee
brought before him, an arbitrator cannot prohibit an employer from applying discriminatory practices to other employees.'4
The effect of the Mitsubishi and McMahon arbitrability test upon the
Supreme Court's Alexander decision declaring Title VII nonarbitrable is
uncertain. In the aftermath of Mitsubishi and McMahon, a number of
Federal Circuit Courts of Appeal have addressed the arbitrability of civil
rights statutes. Nicholson and Gilmer are the only two decisions in which
the federal appellate courts addressed the issue of ADEA arbitrability.
However, every Federal Circuit Court of Appeal that has addressed the
arbitrability of a civil rights statute other than the ADEA has declared the
civil rights statute nonarbitrable.149

146. Nicholson v. CPC International, Inc., 877 F.2d 221, 224-26 (3d Cir. 1989).

147. Id. at 227.
148. Id. at 228.
149. See Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 905 F.2d 104 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding

Title VII employment discrimination claims nonarbitrable, but finding that Supreme Court
may overrule Alexander if faced with this issue again); Utley v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 883
F.2d 184 (Ist Cir. 1989) (holding Title VII employment discrimination claims nonarbitrable);

Nicholson v. CPC International, Inc., 877 F.2d 221 (3d Cir. 1989) (holding ADEA employment
discrimination claims nonarbitrable); Swenson v. Management Recruiters International, Inc.,
858 F.2d 1304 (8th Cir. 1988) (holding Title VII employment discrimination claims nonarbitrable); Wilmington v. J.I. Case Co., 793 F.2d 909, 917 (8th Cir. 1986) (holding section 1981
employment discrimination claims nonarbitrable).
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Congress enacted the Equal Pay Act (EPA), 50 29 U.S.C. section 206(d)
(1990) (section 206(d)), to remedy a serious and endemic problem of
employment discrimination in private industry."' Through the EPA, Congress sought to rid American industry of the outmoded belief that a man,
because of his role in society, should be paid more than a woman even
though the man and woman's duties are the same.5 2 Furthermore, Congress
sought to overcome the depressing social and economic consequences resulting from the payment of reduced wages to female employees. 5 3 Under
section 206(d)(1), employers must pay equal wages to members of the
opposite sex for equal work which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which male and female employees perform under similar
working conditions. Section 206(d)(1) allows an employer to pay a wage
rate differential if the employer pays employees pursuant to a seniority
system, a merit system, a system which measures earnings, or a differential
based on any factor other than sex.
In Keziah v. W.M. Brown & Son, Inc., 888 F.2d 322 (4th Cir. 1989),
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit considered
whether evidence that the defendant, W.M. Brown & Son (Brown), paid a
male sales representative, Michael Dohn, more than the plaintiff, Linda
Keziah, a female sales representative, constituted a prima facie case for
violation of section 206(d)(1). The Fourth Circuit also considered whether
Keziah presented a prima facie claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress and negligent supervision for alleged harassment in the work place
as well as Brown's alleged knowledge of the harassment.
In Keziah Brown, who provides printing services in the southeastern
United States, hired Keziah in August 1984 to operate as a sales representative out of Brown's small outside sales office in Charlotte, North Carolina.
Keziah, who had one and one half years prior experience, joined Dohn,
whom Brown had hired in June 1983, and a male regional sales manager,
Edward Jones, in the Charlotte office. Brown contended that Dohn had
ten years of experience in the printing and paper industries, mostly in
outside sales and marketing, had extensive contacts in the Charlotte area,
was well known in the Charlotte community, and had served as president
of the Charlotte Society of Communicating Arts. Keziah testified that Dohn
told her that his previous jobs were unrelated to printing sales.
Brown compensated its sales representatives with a nine percent commission on regular accounts and a ten percent commission on new accounts.
150. See Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1990) (adding to Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938's, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1990), prohibition against discrimination in
wages because of sex). See 29 C.F.R. §§ 800.102-800.113 (explaining applicability of equal pay
provisions in general).
151. See Dole v. Shenandoah Baptist Church, 899 F.2d 1389, 1398 (4th Cir. 1990) (stating
Congress' purpose in enacting Equal Pay Act).
152. See id.
153. See Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56, reprinted in 1963 U.S. CODE
CoNo. & Anmws. NEws. 59-60 (stating Congress' purpose in enacting Equal Pay Act) (codified
at 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1990)).
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In practice, Brown paid each salesperson a draw, based on the salesperson's
experience and projected sales, allegedly to help the salesperson through the
difficult first years of sales. Keziah's yearly draw was $22,000 while Dohn's
draw was $32,500. Brown allegedly expected the salespersons to earn sales
commissions at least equaling the draw. Keziah presented evidence to indicate
that from 1984 until 1987, neither Keziah nor Dohn earned sales commissions
equal to their respective draws.
Keziah alleged that tension existed in the Charlotte office throughout
her employment with Brown and that she suffered harassment and humiliation in the office. According to Keziah, Dohn or Jones secretly withheld
telephone messages to usurp her prospective sales opportunities and secretly
retrieved information from her business files and her mail. Keziah asserted
that Jones unnecessarily delayed or denied her sales orders and requests for
quotes and set higher mark ups for her customers than those set for Dohn's
customers. Keziah claimed that Dohn was stealing her accounts and that
Jones, although aware of Dohn's conduct, did nothing to stop Dohn's
'activities. When Keziah complained of Dohn's tactics, Jones allegedly gave
several of Keziah's accounts to Dohn. The evidence demonstrated that many
accounts were switched between Keziah and Dohn.
Brown fired Keziah on April 1, 1987, allegedly as a result of poor job
performance. Keziah, claiming that her termination resulted from, and is
evidence of, gender-based discrimination, sued Brown in the United States
District Court for the Western District of North Carolina. The district court
granted summary judgment against Keziah on her EPA, intentional infliction
of emotional distress, and negligent supervision claims. After hearing Keziah's case, the district court reasoned that Brown had shown that Dohn's
higher salary was not a violation of the EPA because Dohn's salary was
based on Dohn's qualifications, a permissible factor under the EPA as a
factor other than sex. The district court granted summary judgment against
Keziah on the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress because
the conduct that Keziah alleged did not meet the stringent standard of
outrageousness that North Carolina law requires. Having found that Keziah
could not prevail on the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress,
the district court entered summary judgment against Keziah on the negligent
supervision claim, which was predicated upon the emotional distress claim.
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit noted that to establish a prima facie
violation of the EPA, a female plaintiff must demonstrate that she is
receiving lower wages than a male co-worker for equal work requiring equal
skill, effort, and responsibility. According to the court, once a plaintiff
establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to prove
by a preponderance of the evidence that the wage differential resulted from
a seniority system, a merit system, a system pegging earnings to quality or
quantity of production or any factor other than sex. While explaining that
differences in experience, training, or ability of workers may justify differences in their salaries as a factor other than sex, the Fourth Circuit noted
that the employer's burden is heavy, and the exceptions must be narrowly
construed.
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The Fourth Circuit approved the district's finding that Keziah and Dohn
performed the exact same job. To conclude that a wage differential existed
between Keziah and Dohn, the Fourth Circuit relied upon the fact that
Brown paid the $22,000 draw to Keziah and the $32,500 draw to Dohn
regardless of the actual commissions earned and despite the fact that neither
ever earned commissions equal to their respective draws. Because Brown
never reduced the draws, nor carried forward the deficits, and even referred
to the annual payments as base salary or guaranteed pay in Brown's own
records, the Fourth Circuit approved the district court's conclusion that the
draws were in fact unequal base salaries.
To rebut Keziah's prima facie showing that she received lower wages
than Dohn for equal skill, effort, and responsibility, Brown claimed that
the wage differential resulted from an experience differential which was the
"any factor other than sex" exception under the EPA. Noting the conflicting
testimony and evidence regarding Dohn's actual experience in the printing
industry, the Fourth Circuit found a genuine question concerning whether
an experience differential actually existed between Keziah and Dohn. The
Fourth Circuit criticized the district court's decision as a credibility decision
that should have been left to the jury, and noted the district court's failure
to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Accordingly,
the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment
in favor of Brown on Keziah's EPA claim and remanded the claim for
trial.
After finding that Keziah's evidence established a prima facie violation
of the EPA, the Fourth Circuit turned to Keziah's claim of intentional
infliction of emotional distress. The Fourth Circuit explained that the
elements of an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim in North
Carolina are extreme and outrageous conduct, intent, causation, and severe
emotional distress. Relying on Hogan v. Forsyth Country Club, 340 S.E.2d
116, 123 (N.C. App. 1985), the Fourth Circuit explained that conduct
sufficiently outrageous to give rise to liability must be so outrageous in
character and so extreme in degree as to go beyond all possible bounds of
decency, and to be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized
community.
To support the emotional distress claim, Keziah testified that Dohn
withheld Keziah's telephone messages and secretly retrieved Keziah's business
files and mail to usurp her prospective sales opportunities. Keziah also
asserted that Jones delayed and denied Keziah's sales orders and requests
for quotes, arbitrarily transferred Keziah's customer accounts to Dohn, and
set higher mark ups for Keziah's customers than those set for Dohn's.
Keziah further claimed that Dohn and Jones harassed, humiliated and
subjected Keziah to an adverse employment environment. Agreeing with the
district court, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the incidents in this case
did not rise to the required level of intolerability. The Fourth Circuit also
noted that Keziah did not appear to suffer severe emotional distress because
she failed to testify to any physical ailment related to emotional distress
but instead attributed her own distress to frustration. Accordingly, the

